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Abstract 
Using a hand-collected sample of hedge fund activist engagements from 1994 to 2014, we 
analysed the role of derivatives in hedge fund activism. We found that the abnormal returns 
of targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives exceeded the abnormal returns 
of targets of hedge fund activists who employed derivatives around the activist engagement 
disclosure period. We also found that idiosyncratic volatility of targets of hedge fund activists 
who did not use derivatives was more reduced than those of targets of hedge fund activists 
who used derivatives.  Finally, hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives increased the 
probability of takeovers. 
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I. Introduction 
Activist hedge funds have been on the rise and their organisational structure position them to 
be efficient activists. Lack of regulation in the hedge fund industry also plays a major role in 
providing hedge funds with enough flexibility to undertake activist demands. For instance, 
hedge funds are not subject to the ERISA or “prudent man” regulations and are not required 
to maintain high levels of diversification for them to receive preferential tax status. Hedge 
funds typically “lock-up” investor capital for a prolonged period of time to carry out their 
strategies and ask investors to provide withdrawal requests in advance. Mutual funds, on the 
other hand, are required to maintain high levels of liquidity and will have to accept daily 
withdrawal requests, if any. This is where hedge funds have an edge over activists like 
mutual funds with respect to undertaking activist engagements, especially since activist 
campaigns may require the activist to hold large, illiquid blocks for prolonged periods of 
time.  
This paper analyses and discusses an important tool used by hedge funds, which can prove to 
be an effective element while undertaking activist engagements: derivatives.   
Bill Ackman vs. Herbalife: An Example of Derivatives Use by Activist Hedge Funds 
In this section, we provide an example to highlight how hedge fund activists use derivatives. 
One of the most popular hedge fund activist engagements was William Ackman’s Pershing 
Square Capital Management targeting Herbalife.  
William Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management bet $1 billion against Herbalife 
after accusing it of running a pyramid scheme. In 2013, Ackman swapped more than 40% of 
his shares for put options, as per Pershing Square’s investor letter.  
The letter stated the following:  
“In order to mitigate the risk of further mark-to-market losses on Herbalife, in recent weeks 
we have restructured the position by reducing our short equity position by more than 40% 
and replacing it with long-term derivatives, principally over-the-counter put options. The 
restructuring of the position preserves our opportunity for profit – if the Company fails 
within a reasonable time frame we will make a similar amount of profit as if we had 
maintained the entire initial short position – while mitigating the risk of further substantial 
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mark-to-market losses – because our exposure on the put options is limited to the total 
premium paid. In restructuring the position, we have also reduced the amount of capital 
consumed by the investment from 16% to 12% of our funds.”  
According to this letter, Mr. Ackman recognised losses and covered $400 million worth of 
Herbalife stock after which, he bought puts. This led him to limit his losses from the stock 
going up further. Ackman and Pershing Square would have profited if the stock declined 
below the strike prices and would have only made a minor loss per share if the stock stayed at 
the same level or went up (La Roche, 2013).  
William Ackman’s use of put options in his battle against Herbalife is a classic example of 
how hedge fund activists utilised derivatives while undertaking activist engagements.  
 
There are a number of reasons for hedge fund activists to employ derivatives. According to 
(Anabtawi and Stout, 2008), the business media reported numerous recent cases whereby 
hedge fund activists used “empty voting”1 strategies, thereby leading to widespread interest 
in cases of empty voting. Furthermore, such strategies are “largely unregulated and often 
unseen.” This lack of regulation could be one of the reasons why hedge fund activists utilise 
derivatives as part of their activist strategy.  
Lack of regulation of the overall hedge fund industry can also play a key influence in hedge 
fund activists utilising derivatives. The lack of regulation was recorded by (Helleiner and 
Pagliari, 2010) , who found that in the case of hedge funds, regulators focused on “indirect 
regulation,” that is, they emphasized on the role of banks in providing hedge funds with 
credit while encouraging the funds and their bank counterparties to self-regulate and disclose 
greater information to the markets.2 
The lack of legal barriers that permit hedge funds to utilise leverage, short selling, and 
derivatives in order to achieve their objectives for investors, as evidenced by (Shadab, 2009), 
can also play a role in influencing activist hedge funds to utilise derivatives. Hedge funds are 
                                                           
1 “empty voting” strategy involves the activist separating the right to vote shares from the beneficial 
ownership of these shares. 
2 Also see  EICHENGREEN, B. 2003. Governing global financial markets: international responses to the hedge-
fund problem. Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, 168-198.and ROBOTTI, P. 
2006. Mapping the regulatory debate on hedge funds: a political analysis. FMG Discussion Paper, London, 
Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics.  
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exempt from the Company Act, and as a result, are not subject to the restrictions imposed 
upon financial institutions by the Company Act regulations. Furthermore, under the Company 
Act, investment companies using short sales or derivatives as part of their strategy must 
hedge their positions with an offsetting trade or hold liquid securities of an equivalent value 
in a segregated account. Since this is not applicable to hedge funds, they can be more flexible 
while using derivatives, and as a result, can be more effective while pursuing activist 
strategies. (Shadab, 2009) also found that the beneficial performance of hedge funds was 
attributable to the legal regime under which hedge funds operated, thereby allowing them to 
pursue the aforementioned innovative investment strategies. This lack of legal barrier also 
contributes incentives for hedge fund managers to capture the gains from financial 
innovation.  
(Chen, 2011) provides further evidence as to how the use of derivatives can actually 
contribute to a successful and an effective hedge fund activist strategy. According to (Chen, 
2011), hedge funds using derivatives were found to have exhibited lower fund risks (e.g., 
market risk, and event risk). He further found evidence indicating that funds using derivatives 
were less likely to liquidate in a poor market state. 
(Chen, 2011) also found that derivatives were more used by hedge funds that required higher 
minimum investment, charged higher fees, had a shorter capital lockup period, and employed 
an effective auditing service. Since (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) found that the average 
hedge fund activist holding period was only 18 months, it makes sense for hedge fund 
activists to utilise derivatives in order to expedite their activist strategy. Furthermore, (Chen, 
2011) found that although using derivatives did not help prevent failure of the fund, it did 
mitigate the unfavourable influence of severe market conditions on fund operation, and 
further found that derivatives use in hedge funds was mainly associated with lower 
systematic risk. This is a major requirement for the success of the hedge fund activist 
strategy, and therefore, justifies why the market reaction is positive and statistically 
significant when hedge fund activists using derivatives disclose their stake. 
By analysing a hand-collected sample of hedge fund activist engagements, we gauge the 
market reaction when hedge fund activists who use derivatives as a tool to accumulate target 
stock, disclose their stakes in the target firms. We also examine whether hedge fund activists 
employ derivatives as a method to drive down volatility of the target share prices. We further 
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analyse the role of derivatives with respect to the most profitable3 and popular activist 
strategy: mergers.  
Our results provide valuable contributions towards understanding the role of derivatives in 
hedge fund activist engagements.  
First, we find that the market reacts positively towards targets of hedge fund activists around 
the period of disclosure irrespective of whether hedge fund activists used derivatives or not, 
that is, the abnormal returns were positive for both targets of hedge fund activists who used 
derivatives and targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives. However, the 
abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives exceeded the 
abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives and the difference 
was statistically significant. This was further justified by multivariate analysis where the 11-
day CARs were regressed against a set of explanatory variables. This result suggests that the 
market believed that hedge fund activists who purchased the target shares directly had a 
higher probability of successful activism than hedge fund activists who adopted a “wait-and-
watch” approach by using derivatives.  
Second, we found that both hedge fund activists who used derivatives and did not use 
derivatives aided in the reduction of idiosyncratic volatility of their targets post the 
announcement date. However, the idiosyncratic volatility was found to have reduced more for 
targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives.  
Finally, we found that hedge fund activists who did not employ derivatives increased the 
probability of takeovers of their targets, thereby justifying the positive market reaction 
towards these targets. (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) attributed positive abnormal returns 
experienced by the target around the activist engagement period to the ability of the activist 
to push for the sale of the target. Furthermore, we found that the hedge fund activists who did 
not use derivatives targeted smaller companies compared to the targets of hedge fund 
activists who used derivatives. This made it easier for the hedge fund activists to pursue the 
sale of the target without having to seek an increase in effective ownership stakes through the 
usage of derivatives (Hu and Black, 2007).  
                                                           
3 See GREENWOOD, R. & SCHOR, M. 2009. Investor activism and takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics, 92, 
362-375. And BECHT, M., FRANKS, J. R., GRANT, J. & WAGNER, H. F. 2015. The returns to hedge fund activism: 
An international study. 
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Our paper has numerous implications and contributions. This is the first paper that analyses 
the role of derivatives in hedge fund activism in a comprehensive manner. Earlier studies 
have considered the possibilities of derivatives influencing hedge fund activism, but have not 
comprehensively studied the role of derivatives, especially in the context of volatility.  
Second, this paper studies the market reaction to the use of derivatives by hedge fund 
activists. The finding that the market rewards targets of hedge fund activists who do not use 
derivatives more than targets of hedge fund activists who use derivatives suggests that the 
market has more confidence in hedge fund activists who purchase shares directly and engage 
in activism rather than adopt a “wait-and-watch” approach by using derivatives. The market 
reaction towards hedge fund activists who use derivatives is an important contribution 
towards understanding the role of derivatives in shareholder activism.  
Finally, our paper provides a testing ground for studying the value creation through the usage 
of derivatives. (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) found that the abnormal positive reactions 
experienced when an activist disclosed its stake was attributed to the ability of the activist to 
force the company to be acquired. (Becht et al., 2015) further supported the finding by 
concluding that takeovers are the most popular activist engagement. Our finding suggests that 
hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives increased the probability of takeover of their 
target companies, thereby indicating that derivatives are ineffective financial instruments 
while undertaking activist engagements. The market rewards those hedge fund activists who 
purchase shares directly and engage in activism and it is these activists that are more 
successful in pursuing the sale of their targets, in comparison to those hedge fund activists 
who adopt a “wait-and-watch” approach by using derivatives.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines a comprehensive review of 
literature of hedge fund activism. Section III outlines the hypotheses used to analyse the 
objectives of the paper. Section IV outlines the data. Section V outlines the methodology 
used for empirical analysis. Section VI provides the results and discussion. Section VII 
concludes. 
II. Review of Literature 
Since the SEC adopted the Regulation MA-related “free communication” Rule 14a-12 in 
1999 (Briggs, 2006), there was a boom in hedge fund activism in the United States. As a 
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result, a number of studies have examined the impact of activism on hedge fund firm 
performances.  
(Brav et al., 2008) pioneered this area to analyse the impact of hedge fund activism using a 
large sample over the time period between 2001 and 2006. Their paper found that hedge fund 
activists proposed strategic, operational, and financial remedies with success or partial 
success in two-thirds of the cases. 
(Clifford, 2008) found that certain features of hedge funds like longer lock-ups and 
withdrawal notification periods played a major role in assisting their activist efforts. The 
targets of hedge fund activists were found to have large excess returns in equity investments 
as well as improved operating performance because of activist outcomes. The paper also 
found that hedge fund activists generated significantly greater returns compared with their 
passive peers, thereby concluding that their returns could have mitigated their monitoring 
costs.  
(Becht et al., 2010) studied 362 European activist interventions using a sample that included 
both public and private interventions. The public activist interventions were associated with 
positive abnormal returns around the time of activist stake disclosures. Private activism 
generated less returns compared to public activism and this was attributed to the finding that 
public activism was associated with a higher probability of takeovers.  
(Mooradian and Boyson, 2010) studied the influence of intense hedge fund activism on target 
firms. Activists were classified as “intense” if the activist hedge fund acquired all or a portion 
of the target firm’s stake in a setting other than open market and when one of the following 
conditions remained valid: either the activist hedge fund’s filing with the SEC stated a 
specific activism agenda or the activist hedge fund obtained more than one type of the target 
firm’s securities. They found that targets of intense hedge fund activists displayed strong 
improvements in operating performance for up to three years following the activism, whereas 
the remaining targets did not. It was also found that all hedge fund activists, both intense and 
non-intense, gained from the improved target stock performance during the activism period.  
(Boyson and Mooradian, 2011) found that activist hedge funds improved both short-term 
stock performance and long-term operating performance of the target firms and concluded 
that activist hedge funds benefitted target firms’ shareholders and the hedge funds 
themselves.  
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Studies also showed that hedge fund activists were also known to have created positive long 
term impact on their target firms. (He et al., 2016) studied the impact of hedge fund activism 
on corporate innovation and found that innovative firms were as likely to be targeted by 
hedge fund activists as non-innovative firms. They also found that activist hedge funds 
generated positive abnormal returns to shareholders of target innovative firms during the 5-
year period post intervention, thereby concluding that activist hedge funds were not myopic 
investors and that they generated long-term benefits to shareholders of innovative firms by 
enhancing the innovation output of their targets. (Bebchuk et al., 2015) tested the empirical 
validity of the claim that interventions by hedge fund activists had a detrimental effect on 
long-term interests of companies and their shareholders by examining a long five-year 
window following activist interventions and found that the data did not support this claim. 
The findings of their study implied that policymakers and institutional investors should not 
accept the validity of assertions that activist interventions were costly to firms and their 
shareholders in the long term and such claims did not provide a valid basis for limiting the 
rights, powers, and involvement of shareholders.  
To sum up, existing literature generally suggests the positive effects of activist efforts by 
hedge funds. But very few studies examined the mechanism through which activist hedge 
funds created value. For instance, (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) attributed the positive 
abnormal returns of target firms around the time an activist disclosed its stake to the ability of 
the activist to force the company to get acquired. This finding is supported by (Becht et al., 
2015) who find that takeovers are the most profitable activist strategy. (Boyson et al., 2016) 
found that activism mergers are more likely when the activist hedge fund has a record of 
aggressive intervention, substantial prior merger experience, or has switched from passive to 
activist ownership. They further found that value creation through activism mergers to have 
arisen from monitoring target management and are not explained by bidder overpayment. 
There are still avenues, to be examined, to understand and conclude whether hedge fund 
activists are superior compared to other activists. For instance, does the type of security, 
which hedge fund activists acquire, have any influence on the impact of activist efforts? Does 
the ability of hedge fund activists to use leverage and complex financial instruments like 
derivatives provide them with greater probability of undertaking successful activist efforts? 
This paper studies the role of derivatives in hedge fund activism. We examine whether the 
ability to use derivatives provide activist hedge funds with any additional advantage while 
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undertaking activist efforts. There is also the need to explore the market reaction to hedge 
fund activist efforts whereby the hedge funds resort to derivatives to build up their positions 
in the target firm.  
(Hu and Black, 2007) found that hedge funds routinely used leverage and options to increase 
their effective ownership stakes in target firms. They found that decoupling votes and shares 
using equity derivatives and other capital market developments was efficient, and they also 
found that hedge funds were the most prominent users of decoupling. They also found that 
hedge funds were found to have held more votes than economic ownership (a situation 
known as “empty voting”) while at other times they held undisclosed economic ownership 
without votes, but often with the de facto ability to acquire votes if needed (a situation known 
as “hidden (or morphable) ownership”). They also suggested that equity derivatives can also 
be used to hold both economic ownership and de facto voting ownership while avoiding the 
disclosure rules that address direct positions in shares.  
The study by (Hu and Black, 2007) suggest that it is possible that derivatives can play an 
important role in achieving activist efforts. This paper aims to examine the role of derivatives 
to understand how the market responds when hedge fund activists utilise either “empty 
voting” or “hidden ownership.” Since (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) suggest that takeovers 
are the most profitable activist strategy, and since derivatives enable hedge fund activists to 
increase their ownership, thereby increasing their voting power, this paper also aims to 
analyse whether derivatives enable hedge fund activists to increase the probability of sale of 
the target firms.   
III. Hypotheses 
The motivation of this empirical paper is to answer two research questions: (1) Do hedge 
fund activists, using derivatives, create more value for their targets? (2) Does the use of 
derivatives increase the probability of takeovers involving hedge fund activists?  
The first testable hypothesis is constructed as follows: 
H1: Hedge Fund Activists Created Short-Term and Long-Term Value to Target Firms Using 
Derivatives 
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We measure short-term value creation by using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
computed using the market model. Long-term value creation is measured using Buy-and-
Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) computed using the market-adjusted model.  
Testing H1 helps us to analyse why activist hedge funds rarely used derivatives (Partnoy, 
2015). We examine this from the perspective of market reaction, that is, testing H1 would 
help us to understand the market reaction when hedge fund activists using derivatives 
announce their stakes in the target firms. Testing H1 would also help to analyse whether the 
market has high expectations on hedge fund activists exercising their derivatives to achieve a 
successful activist engagement. 
If activist hedge funds create short-term value and/or long-term value to their targets by using 
derivatives to undertake activist engagements, then our finding should encourage more hedge 
fund activists to use derivatives. On the contrary, if activist hedge funds did not create any 
value by using derivatives, then it would justify why only few activist hedge funds used 
derivatives.  
The second testable hypothesis is constructed as follows: 
H2: The Use of Derivatives had a Positive Influence on Hedge Fund Activist’s Target Share 
Price Volatility  
Past studies found that use of derivatives resulted in a decrease in volatility of underlying 
stocks. (Skinner, 1989) found that the variance of the stock returns decreased by an average 
of 4.8% as a result of options on those stocks. (Conrad, 1989) found that variance on excess 
stock returns reduced from 2.29% to 1.79% for 200 days after their listing as a result of 
derivatives. (Bansal et al., 1989) concluded that the volatility reduced by 6.4% after options 
are listed.  
Testing H2 examines whether the hedge fund activists were able to reduce idiosyncratic 
volatility by using derivatives. It also helps us to understand whether derivatives played a key 
role in reducing idiosyncratic volatility. If hedge fund activists using derivatives reduced 
idiosyncratic volatility and hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives did not reduce 
idiosyncratic volatility, then it would highlight the importance of derivatives in hedge fund 
activism.  
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H3: Hedge Fund Activists Increased the Probability of Takeovers of Target Firms Using 
Derivatives. 
(Greenwood and Schor, 2009) suggested that the positive abnormal returns realized by 
activist targets are due to the ability of the activist to force the company to be acquired. And 
these findings were reinforced by (Becht et al., 2015). Exercising derivatives would enable 
the activist to gain more shares, and thereby gaining more voting power. As a result, there is a 
greater probability for takeovers involving activists. Testing H3 could help to understand 
whether the use of derivatives increases the success of the most popular and profitable hedge 
fund activist outcome: takeovers. 
 IV. Data 
Derivatives Sample 
The sample of hedge fund activist engagements was constructed from a hand-collected 
activist sample consisting of SC 13D filings. Every institutional manager, including an 
activist hedge fund, is to file a Schedule 13D filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (S.E.C.), if they acquire more than 5% of a publicly listed firm. These 
documents are required to be filed within 10 days post the purchase of the company’s 
securities. (Greenwood and Schor, 2009).  
The SC 13D filings outline the size of the purchase and summarizes the investors’ intentions. 
Since 2000, it has been common for an activist to attach a letter to the target firm’s 
management or board within their SC 13D filing (Greenwood and Schor, 2009). Each SC 
13D filing contains 8 items. While “Item 4: Purpose of Transaction” outlines the intention of 
the activist, the most important sections for our paper are “Item 1: Security and Issuer,” 
which outlines the type of security purchased, including any derivative contracts, “Item 3: 
Source and Amount of Funds or other consideration,” which outlines the source and the 
amount of funds for each activist effort, and “Item 5: Interest in the Securities of the Issuer,” 
which outlines the voting rights of the activist, and other security related information. There 
is also an additional section titled “Item 6: Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings, or 
Relationships with Respect to Securities of the Issuer,” which outlines any underlying 
derivative contracts, or other arrangements made by the activist pertaining to the target firm.  
Our central activist database was constructed as follows: First, the list of activists was 
recorded from the Thomson Reuters Shareholder Activism Intelligence database. The SEC’s 
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EDGAR database was then accessed and the initial Schedule 13D filings of each activist was 
documented and an excel database was constructed. Each Schedule 13D filing consists of 
eight items. All eight items were recorded, and based on “Item 4: Purpose of Transaction,” 
the activist demands were classified and recorded. Each activist’s website was then visited 
and the type of Activist was recorded. In the event that the type of activist was not clear, we 
utilised websites such as WhaleWisdom to identify the type of activist. This was done, 
especially in the case of Hedge Fund activists. 
Our central activist sample consisted of 5,926 activist events by 872 activists spanning from 
1994 to 2014. The activists are classified as follows: Hedge funds, Financial institutions, 
Private equity companies, Investment managers, Investment companies, Individual investors, 
Industrial owners, Pension funds, and Shareholder committees. Since our paper examines 
only hedge fund activists, we further filtered the activist database and our final activist 
sample resulted in 3,806 SC 13D filings, which were filed by 290 activist hedge funds. By 
examining Items 1, 3, 5, and 6 of each SC 13D filing of hedge fund activists, it was found 
that there were 275 activism events where hedge fund activists used derivatives4. The 
distribution of hedge fund activist engagements, where the hedge fund activist used 
derivatives, by year is outlined in Appendix A.  
As evidenced from Appendix A, there was a major drop in the use of derivatives in the years 
2008, 2009, 2010. This suggests that the decision to use derivatives was heavily influenced 
by the 2007 financial crisis. An increase in the use of derivatives in years 2013 and 2014 
suggests that derivatives are once again becoming popular among hedge fund activists post 
the financial crisis.  
After accounting for stock price information from CRSP and accounting information from 
COMPUSTAT, the final sample of hedge fund activists using derivatives consisted of 175 
activism events.  
According to (Partnoy, 2015), activist hedge funds were found to have rarely used 
derivatives, instead choosing to buy stocks of targets firms they believe were undervalued. 
According to a study by (Deloitte, 2014), the additional costs arising from credit valuation 
adjustment (CVA5) charges were found to have been highest for equity derivatives.  This 
could be one of the reasons why most activist hedge funds prefer to directly buy the target 
                                                           
4 The derivatives mainly considered in this paper are options, futures, and forwards.  
5 CVA can be described as the market value of counterparty credit risk. 
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stock instead of purchasing derivatives. Yet another reason for our low sample could be 
because most hedge fund activists aim to be more pro-active in their activist engagements 
instead of adopting a “wait-and-watch” approach by purchasing derivatives. 
Matching Sample 
To analyse the short-term and long-term market reaction, a matching sample was also 
constructed from the sample of activist engagements by hedge fund activists who did not use 
derivatives. The matching sample was constructed based on year, targets’ size, and targets’ 
market-to-book ratio.  More specifically, in each industry and calendar year, the targets were 
classified into quintiles based on their market values and in each quintile, the targets were 
sorted on their market-to-book value ratios. Targets of hedge fund activists who did not use 
derivatives close whose market-to-book ratios were close to those targets of hedge fund 
activists who used derivatives were selected as the matching sample. The matching sample 
contained 241 observations.  
 
V. Methodology  
5.1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
To analyse the gains experienced around the time hedge fund activists using derivatives 
disclose their stakes in the target firms, the announcement period excess returns were 
measured by computing cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). According to (Moeller et al., 
2004), the most traditional measure of announcement period excess returns is to compute 
abnormal percentage returns using standard event study methods. These abnormal returns 
were computed over a 11-day event window [-5, +5].  
These announcement period excess returns were computed using the market model shown in 
equation (1):  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼 +  𝛽𝑟𝑚𝑡) 𝑡 = 1, 2, 𝑇    (1) 
Where, ARit is the abnormal return of target company i on day t; Rit is the return of the target 
company i on day t, and rmt is the market return on day t (measured by CRSP value-weighted 
index return).  
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The excess returns of the target companies around the time when hedge fund activists 
disclose their stake is the sum of the abnormal returns over the 11-days (-5 to +5) 
surrounding the announcement day of the activist engagement as in equation (2): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡=+1
𝑡=−1
                                                   (2) 
 
5.2. Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
We compute and analyse the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to examine the long-
run announcement period gains to both targets of hedge fund activists who use derivatives 
and the targets of hedge fund activists who do not use derivatives.  
To compute BHARs, we follow the methodology of (Liang, 2008), outlined as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 =  ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑚𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1                               (3) 
 Where: rit is the monthly stock return and rmt is, the market return 
The mean BHAR over a period T is: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑇 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇                                                                   (4)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
5.3. Single-factor Analysis 
The cumulative abnormal returns for targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives 
around the time when hedge fund activists disclosed their stakes in the target firms were 
analysed by computing the difference between the sample of targets of hedge fund activists 
who used derivatives and the matching sample and by using the t-test (two sided) to examine 
statistical significance of the difference.  
5.4. Multiple-Factor Analysis 
To examine the influence of derivatives on the cumulative abnormal returns, the 11-day 
CARs were regressed against a set of control variables using the following OLS regression: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑉) + 𝛽3 (
𝑀
𝐵
)  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5 (
𝐶𝐹
𝐸
)
+  𝛽6(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ) + 𝛽7 (
𝑃
𝐸
) + 𝑓𝑡  +  𝜀                             (5)      
The dependent variable in equation (5) is the 11-day CARs computed using the market 
model. The key variable of interest is the Derivative dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives and 0 for targets of hedge fund 
activists who did not use derivatives. All other control variables are explained in Appendix B. 
Equation (5) also accounts for year-fixed effects. 
To examine whether the use of derivatives increases the probability of takeovers involving 
hedge fund activists, Probit model is introduced as follows: 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑉) + 𝛽3 (
𝑀
𝐵
) +  𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5 (
𝐶𝐹
𝐸
)
+ 𝛽6(Cash) + 𝛽7 (
𝑃
𝐸
) +  𝜀                             (6)      
The dependent variable in equation (6) is the Acquired dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 for targets that are acquired and 0 for targets that remain independent following the 
involvement of hedge fund activists. The key variable of interest is still the dummy variable, 
Derivative that takes the value of 1 if hedge fund activists used derivatives to pursue activist 
strategies and 0 otherwise. All other control variables are explained in Appendix B.  
5.5. Idiosyncratic Volatility 
The idiosyncratic price volatility of the targeted stocks by the hedge fund activists is 
examined to reveal the possible impact of the derivatives on the market reaction as well as on 
the volatility of stock prices around the time when the hedge fund activist disclosed stake in 
the target firm.  
The methodology of (Bali and Cakici, 2008) was followed to compute idiosyncratic 
volatility. The following steps were followed: 
Step 1: The return of each stock was assumed to be driven by a common factor and firm 
specific shock εi. Assuming a single factor return generating process, idiosyncratic volatility 
is measured relative to the traditional CAPM: 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓,𝑡) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (7) 
Where:  
Ri,t – return on stock I; Rm,t – market return; rf,t - risk-free rate; εi,t – idiosyncratic return 
Step 2: The market model is estimated: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (8) 
Step 3: The idiosyncratic volatility of stock i is measured as the standard deviation of the 
residuals:  
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 =  √𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖,𝑡)   (9)  
 
 
VI. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 outlines the summary statistics of characteristics of targets of hedge fund activists 
who use derivatives as well as the matching sample. The results of Table 1 suggest that hedge 
fund activists use derivatives while targeting large-sized companies, as evidenced from 
comparing the market value. This could be because hedge fund activists prefer “hidden 
(morphable) ownership,” (Hu and Black, 2007). Large sized companies have many 
shareholders and it is therefore, much more difficult to pursue activism with regards to these 
companies. As a result, hedge fund activists could opt for holding undisclosed economic 
ownership without votes, but often with the de facto ability to acquire votes if needed through 
the use of derivatives. This situation is known as “hidden (morphable) ownership,” (Hu and 
Black, 2007).  
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
6.2. Gains to Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In this section, we examine the market reaction towards disclosure announcement by hedge 
fund activists who use derivatives and compare the gains with the matching sample. The 
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results of the difference between the 11-day CARs6 of the two samples are displayed in Panel 
A of Table 2.  
As evidenced from Table 27, although the market reacts positively when hedge fund activists, 
who use derivatives, disclose their stakes in their targets, the gains are larger in the case 
where the hedge fund activists did not employ derivatives. Furthermore, the difference 
between the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns of the two samples were found to be 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Hedge fund activists who employ derivatives are granted the rights to purchase the target’s 
shares at a future date. The market, therefore, might treat these hedge fund activists as being 
hesitant towards undertaking the activist engagements, or might assume that these hedge fund 
activists do not have the necessary ownership to successfully pursue the activist engagement. 
On the other hand, the hedge fund activists who do not employ derivatives purchase the 
shares directly, and are therefore, capable of immediately negotiating with the target’s 
management. The market might therefore, value their “confidence” more than the hedge fund 
activists who adopt a “wait-and-watch” approach by employing derivatives.  
The results of the univariate analysis are further justified in the multivariate setting. The 11-
day CARs are regressed against a set of control variables, and the results of the OLS 
regression are displayed in Panel B of Table 2. The key variable of interest is the Derivative 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for hedge fund activist engagements whereby the 
hedge fund uses derivatives.  
As evidenced from Panel B of Table 2, the Derivative dummy variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level across all four specifications, thereby further justifying 
                                                           
6We considered the 3-day and the 5-day event windows for both the univariate and the multivariate analysis. The univariate analysis showed 
that the difference in CARs were insignificant for the 3-day and the 5-day windows. This was further justified by the multivariate analysis, 
that is, the Derivative dummy variable was negative but insignificant across all four specifications for both the 3-day and the 5-day event 
windows. Leverage and Cash/Assets were the only variables affecting the 3-day event CARs. Both were negatively related to the 3-day 
CARs. This finding suggested that firms that had high leverage and lower levels of cash experienced negative short-term market reaction. 
Leverage was once the again the variable affecting the 5-day CARs and it was negatively related to the 5-day CARs. This finding suggested 
that once again, higher the firm leverage, poorer the market-reaction. For brevity, the results are not reported in Table 2. As a robustness 
check, we also computed the 3-day, 5-day, and 11-day abnormal returns using the market-adjusted model and found the results to be similar. 
For brevity, these results are also not reported in tables.  
 
7 In the analysis of CARs, four observations are missing: three observations missing for derivative sample and one observation missing for 
non-derivative sample. This is because the stock price returns or the market returns are missing, which are needed to compute CARs 
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our finding that the targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives outperformed 
the targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives in the short-run. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
This section examines the long-term gains to targets of hedge fund activist engagements. 
Table 3 provides the results where the 6-month BHARs, 12-month BHARs, and 24-month 
BHARs are compared between the derivative sample, where hedge fund activists used 
derivatives, and the matching sample, where the hedge fund activists did not use derivatives.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
As observed from Table 38, there is no statistical difference between the two samples, thereby 
indicating that the use of derivatives has no impact on the long-term market reaction. Given 
that the individual BHARs are not significant, we can conclude that irrespective of whether 
they used derivatives or not, hedge fund activists did not create any long-term value to their 
target firms.  
6.3. Hedge Fund Activists, Derivatives, and Volatility 
In this section, we examine the idiosyncratic volatility of the target companies’ stock prices 
before and after the hedge fund activist, who used derivatives, disclosed its stake. The results 
are displayed in Table 49. It was found that both hedge fund activists that used derivatives 
and the hedge fund activists that did not use derivatives reduced the idiosyncratic volatility of 
their target firms’ stocks. However, the reduction in idiosyncratic volatility was found to be 
greater for target firms where the hedge fund activist did not use derivatives.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Past studies found that use of derivatives resulted in a decrease in volatility of underlying 
stocks. (Skinner, 1989) found that the variance of the stock returns decreased by an average 
of 4.8% as a result of options on those stocks. (Conrad, 1989) found that variance on excess 
                                                           
8 In the analysis of BHARs, more observations are missing. This could be because the target could have either been acquired or simply 
delisted within 6 months, 12 months, or 24 months.  
 
9 There are two observations missing in the pre-announcement period for the derivative sample. This is because there were stock price 
returns and market returns missing for these two observations. 
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stock returns reduced from 2.29% to 1.79% for 200 days after their listing as a result of 
derivatives. (Bansal et al., 1989) concluded that the volatility reduced by 6.4% after options 
are listed.  
Our finding of a reduction in idiosyncratic volatility is consistent with the aforementioned 
findings and suggests that activist hedge funds utilised derivatives to drive down the volatility 
associated with the underlying stocks of the target firms. However, the finding that hedge 
fund activists who did not employ derivatives reduced the idiosyncratic volatility by a greater 
amount suggests that the use of derivatives had no unique impact on the idiosyncratic 
volatility.  
 
 
6.4. Do hedge fund activists utilise derivatives to increase probability of sale of the target 
firm? 
This section examines whether hedge fund activists used derivatives to increase the 
probability of sale of their targets. (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) had found that the positive 
abnormal returns experienced around the time the activist disclosed its stake in the target 
were attributed to the ability of activists to push for the sale of the target. These findings were 
further supported by (Becht et al., 2015), who found that takeovers were the more profitable 
and popular activist strategy. The findings of (Hu and Black, 2007) suggest that hedge funds 
routinely used leverage and options to increase their effective ownership stakes in target 
firms. Increased ownership implies increased voting power, the use of derivatives, therefore, 
could increase the probability of a successful activist campaign. Since takeovers are the most 
popular strategy with hedge fund activists, there is a possibility that hedge fund activists will 
use derivatives to increase their voting power in order to increase the probability of takeovers 
of the target. 
Takeover Sample 
To analyse whether hedge fund activists increased the probability of takeovers by using 
derivatives, our hedge fund activism database was merged with the Thomson One Banker 
Mergers and Acquisitions database to obtain the number of deals with hedge fund activist 
involvement where the hedge fund activist used derivatives. According to methodology of 
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(Greenwood and Schor, 2009), only those deals that occurred within 18 months after the 
hedge fund activist using derivatives disclosed its stake were considered for the analysis. It 
was found that there were 178 deals with hedge fund activist involvement and includes both 
targets where hedge fund activists used derivatives and targets where hedge fund activists did 
not use derivatives in acquiring target firm’s stock.  Table 5 outlines the distribution of these 
deals. Panel A of Table 5 outlines the distribution of deals by year and Panel B outlines the 
distribution of deals by industry. Panel C of Table 5 outlines a few deal characteristics. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
The results of the Probit model are shown in Table 6. As evidenced from Table 6, the key 
dummy variable Derivative is negative and significant, thereby implying that hedge fund 
activists who did not use derivatives increased the probability of takeover of the target firms. 
This could be because activist hedge funds were found to have rarely used derivatives 
(Partnoy, 2015). It could also be because of the difference in target size. It was found that 
hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives targeted firms of smaller size. The ease of 
pushing for a sale of target of smaller size could have also contributed to this result. The 
inverse relationship between target size and probability of takeovers, as evidenced from 
Table 6, supports this theory. Given that the target size was small and given that such targets 
were more prone to takeovers, there was no reason for hedge fund activists to use derivatives 
to pursue takeovers. Finally, this result also justifies why targets of hedge fund activists who 
did not use derivatives outperformed targets who used derivatives around the time the hedge 
fund activist announced its stake. (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) attributed the abnormal 
returns around the time of activist disclosure to the ability of hedge fund activist to push for 
the sale of the target. Since hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives increased the 
probability of takeovers, the market reaction was more positive for the targets of these hedge 
fund activists. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper examined the role of derivatives in hedge fund activism. More specifically, this 
paper examined whether hedge fund activists utilise derivatives to maximize their activist 
strategies, thereby creating value.  
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We analysed the cumulative abnormal returns around the time when hedge fund activists 
using derivatives disclosed their stakes in the target firm and compared them with the 
cumulative abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who did not employ 
derivatives and found that the 11-day CARs of targets of hedge fund activists who did not use 
derivatives exceeded the 11-day CARs of targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives 
thereby indicating that the market reacted positively when hedge fund activists did not 
employ derivatives. This suggested that the market had higher confidence in hedge fund 
activists who did not use derivatives, since these activists increased their target ownership by 
directly purchasing shares compared to a “wait-and-watch” approach adopted by hedge fund 
activists who employed derivatives.  
We also analysed the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and found that irrespective of whether 
they used derivatives or not, hedge fund activists did not create any long-term value to their 
targets.  
Next, we examined whether hedge fund activists, by using derivatives, reduced the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the target share price and found that both hedge fund activists who 
used derivatives and those who did not use derivatives reduced idiosyncratic volatility of the 
target firms. Previous studies had found that stock price volatility was reduced due to the use 
of derivatives. Our finding that hedge fund activists who did use derivatives reduced the 
idiosyncratic volatility by a larger amount than hedge fund activists who used derivatives, 
however, suggested that hedge fund activists did not use derivatives with the intention of 
reducing targets’ stock price volatility.  
We also examined whether hedge fund activists increased the probability of takeover by 
using derivatives and found that hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives increased 
the probability of takeovers by 29.52%. This finding helped to justify why hedge fund 
activists rarely used derivatives (Partnoy, 2015).  
Overall, our paper concluded that the use of derivatives did not create any additional value 
for targets of hedge fund activists. On the contrary, it further justified why hedge fund 
activists rarely used derivatives. Since takeovers were found to be the most profitable and 
most popular activist strategy, and since hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives 
increased the probability of takeovers, it was concluded that derivatives do not play any 
major role in aiding the hedge fund activists who pursue the sale of their target firms. Hedge 
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fund activists are better off by directly purchasing shares of the targets that they believe are 
undervalued. 
The contributions of our paper towards the existing academic literature are threefold. This is 
the first paper that examines the role of derivatives in hedge fund activism in a 
comprehensive manner.  
Second, this paper studies the market reaction to the use of derivatives by hedge fund 
activists. Our finding suggests that the market rewards the hedge fund activists who did not 
use derivatives, thereby indicating that the market is more confident in hedge fund activists 
who purchase the target shares directly compared to hedge fund activists who adopt a “wait-
and-watch” approach by employing derivatives.   
Finally, our paper provides a testing ground for studying the value creation through the usage 
of derivatives. The findings of (Greenwood and Schor, 2009) and (Becht et al., 2015) suggest 
that takeovers are the most popular activist engagement. Our finding indicates that hedge 
fund activists who did not use derivatives increase the probability of takeover of their target 
companies, thereby indicating that derivatives are not effective financial instruments while 
undertaking hedge fund activist engagements. There was neither short-term value creation 
nor long-term value creation by hedge fund activists using derivatives. 
Our paper mainly focused on options, futures, and forwards as the derivative instruments 
used by activist hedge funds. Future research could explore the use of other derivative 
instruments, such as credit default swaps, by activist hedge funds and its impact on situations 
related to firm bankruptcy. (Subrahmanyam, 2014) examined the effect of credit default 
swaps on credit risk and found that the credit risk of reference firms increased significantly 
upon the inception of CDS trading. This was also evident in the bankruptcy talks between 
Caesars Entertainment Corp. and activist hedge fund Elliott Management Corp (Keller, 
2014). Future research could examine whether hedge fund activists use such instruments and 
their impact when they target financially distressed firms.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives 
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample of hedge fund activist engagements, portioned by the engagements where hedge fund activists used 
derivatives and matching engagements. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values are shown 
in parentheses. T-test is used to test the difference in means. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
Firm Characteristics 
 Combined Sample  Derivative Sample  Matching Sample  Difference (Derivative – Matching) 
 
Mean N  Mean N  Mean N  Mean P-Value 
MV ($mil) 2187.6 416  2954.98 175  1630.33 241  1324.65*** 0.0000 
Ln(MV) 13.43 410  13.59 174  13.31 236  0.28 0.1150 
M/B 2.186 416  2.197 175  2.177 241  0.020 0.9310 
Leverage 0.3624 411  0.3785 173  0.3508 238  0.0277 0.3260 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.00003 407  0.00004 173  0.00002 234  0.00002 0.3940 
Cash 225.95 413  293.96 174  176.49 239  117.47*** 0.0054 
Cash/Assets 0.1092 413  0.1021 174  0.1144 239  -0.0123 0.2916 
P/E 18.07 401  22.16 170  15.07 231  7.09 0.1211 
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Table 2. Gains to Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives 
This table presents short-term gains of targets of hedge fund activists who use derivatives. Panel A shows univariate analysis. CAR [-5, 5] is the 11-day market model 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement. CARs are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. P-Values are shown in parentheses. T-test is used to test the 
significance of the mean. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. Panel B shows multivariate analysis. Targets’ 
announcement abnormal returns (CAR [-5, 5]) are regressed (OLS) against a set of explanatory variables (Activist dummy and target firm characteristics). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. In all models, industry fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. The number of observations used in 
different specifications may vary because of the missing value of one or more variable. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis    
 Full Sample Derivative Sample Matching Sample  Difference (Derivative – Matching)   
 
Mean N Mean N Mean N  Mean P-Value   
CAR [-5, 5] (%) 3.92*** 412 1.86** 172 5.40*** 240  -3.54*** 0.0029   
 (0.0000)  (0.0331)  (0.0000)       
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable CAR [-5, +5]    
Derivative -0.0340*** -0.0368*** -0.0342*** -0.0395*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
Ln(MV)  -0.0020  0.0037 
 
 (0.721)  (0.540) 
M/B  -0.0065**  -0.0007** 
 
 (0.019)  (0.011) 
Leverage  0.0164  0.0077 
 
 (0.442)  (0.733) 
CF/E   -88.64* -93.06* 
 
  (0.067) (-0.056) 
Cash   0.00002 0.00001 
 
  (0.200) (0.506) 
P/E   -0.00001 0.00001 
   (0.933) (0.941) 
Constant -0.0998 -0.1641*** -0.1028 -0.1988*** 
 
(0.235) (0.001) (0.162) (0.000) 
N 411 400 382 373 
R2 0.0741 0.0999 0.1086 0.1353 
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Table 3. Long-Term Gains to Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives 
This table presents long-term gains of targets of hedge fund activists who use derivatives. BHAR6 is the 6-month market-adjusted model buy-and-hold abnormal returns around the announcement. 
BHAR12 is the 12-month market-adjusted model buy-and-hold abnormal returns around the announcement. BHAR24 is the 24-month market-adjusted model buy-and-hold abnormal returns around the 
announcement. Variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values are shown in parentheses. T-test is used to test the significance of the mean. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Full Sample Derivative Sample Matching Sample  Difference (Derivative – Matching)   
 
Mean N Mean N Mean N  Mean P-Value   
BHAR6 (%) 1.45 324 -0.82 150 3.41 174  -4.23 0.2119   
 
(0.3911)  (0.7292)  (0.1546)     
  
BHAR12 (%) -0.77 303 -2.49 138 0.66 165  -3.15 0.5495   
 (0.7672)  (0.4783)  (0.8629)     
  
BHAR24 (%) 2.95 219 1.44 96 4.14 123  -2.70 0.7500   
 (0.4817)  (0.8263)  (0.4509)       
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Table 4. Idiosyncratic Volatility of Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives 
To examine whether targets of hedge fund activists have improved when hedge fund activists used derivatives, the idiosyncratic volatility of targets is computed before and after the hedge fund activist 
discloses its stake. The methodology of Bali and Cakici (2008) is followed for computing idiosyncratic volatility. Panel A shows idiosyncratic volatility of targets of hedge fund activists using 
derivatives post announcement. Panel B shows idiosyncratic volatility of targets of hedge fund activists not using derivatives post announcement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A.  Idiosyncratic Volatility of Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives  
 
Full Sample Post-Announcement Pre-Announcement Difference (Post – Pre) 
 
Mean N  Mean N  Mean N  Mean P-Value 
  
Volatility (%) 2.78 348  2.52 173  3.04 175  -0.52** 0.0359   
Panel B.  Idiosyncratic Volatility of Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Not Using Derivatives  
 Full Sample Post-Announcement Pre-Announcement Difference (Post – Pre) 
 
 
Mean N  Mean N  Mean N  Mean P-Value 
 
Volatility (%) 2.93 482  2.46 241  3.41 241  -0.95*** 0.0001  
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Table 5. Distribution of Deals with Hedge Fund Activist Involvement 
This table presents deals with hedge fund activist involvement during 1994-2015, which includes both targets where the 
activist hedge fund used derivatives and targets where hedge fund activists did not use derivatives as part of acquiring 
targets’ stock. Panel A outlines the distribution of deals by year. Panel B outlines the distribution of deals by Target Industry. 
Panel A: Distribution of Deals by Year 
Year No. of Deals Percent (%) Year No. of Deals Percent (%) 
1995 1 0.56 2006 11 6.18 
1996 2 1.12 2007 22 12.36 
1997 8 4.49 2008 12 6.74 
1998 6 3.37 2009 7 3.93 
1999 8 4.49 2010 10 5.62 
2000 3 1.69 2011 13 7.30 
2001 2 1.12 2012 12 6.74 
2002 4 2.25 2013 17 9.55 
2003 2 1.12 2014 23 12.92 
2004 3 1.69 2015 7 3.93 
2005 5 2.81 
 
  
   Total 178 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of Deals by Industry 
Industry No. of Deals Percent (%) Year No. of Deals Percent (%) 
Consume
r 
Products 
& 
Services 
12 6.74 Materials 11 6.18 
      
Energy & 
Power 
14 7.87 
Media & 
Entertainment  
9 5.06 
      
Financials 13 7.30 Real Estate 8 4.49 
      
Healthcar
e 
20 11.24 Retail 21 11.80 
      
High 
Technolo
gy 
32 17.98 
Consumer 
Staples 
8 4.49 
      
Industrial
s 
17 9.55 
Telecommunicat
ions 
13 7.30 
      
   Total 178 100.00 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics of Hedge Fund Activism Mergers Using Derivatives 
 
Mean N 
Deal Value ($ mil.) 1944.61 178 
Completed (%) 64.61 178 
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Table 6. Probability of Takeovers of Targets of Hedge Fund Activists Using Derivatives 
Acquired binary variable is regressed against a set of explanatory variables using a probit model. The Acquired binary 
variable takes the value of 1 for targets of hedge fund activists using derivatives, which get acquired and 0 for targets of 
hedge fund activists using derivatives, which do not get acquired. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Acquired    
Derivative -0.1537 -0.1770 -0.3407** -0.2952* 
 
(0.220) (0.266) (0.047) (0.096) 
Ln(MV)  -0.0589  -0.1384** 
 
 (0.212)  (0.025) 
M/B  -0.00002  0.00002 
 
 (0.504)  (0.510) 
Leverage  -0.5462*  -0.3671 
 
 (0.053)  (0.252) 
CF/E   1.330*** 1.491*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash   0.00003 0.0003 
 
  (0.853) (0.253) 
P/E   0.0002 0.0004 
   (0.887) (0.728) 
Constant 0.2469*** 1.3769** 0.2439** 2.0489*** 
 
(0.003) (0.025) (0.034) (0.008) 
N 416 277 262 254 
Pseudo R2 0.0027 0.0229 0.1066 0.1335 
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Appendix A: Distribution of Hedge Fund Activist Engagements Involving Derivatives 
by Year 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Deals by Year 
Year No. of Deals Percent (%) Year No. of Deals Percent (%) 
1994 1 0.36 2005 19 6.91 
1995 1 0.36 2006 20 7.27 
1996 4 1.45 2007 29 10.55 
1997 20 7.27 2008 14 5.09 
1998 7 2.55 2009 6 2.18 
1999 7 2.55 2010 12 4.36 
2000 7 2.55 2011 24 8.73 
2001 6 2.18 2012 13 4.73 
2002 12 4.36 2013 27 9.82 
2003 11 4.00 2014 29 10.55 
2004 11 4.00 
 
  
   Total 275 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Gains to Targets 
CAR [-5, 5] Cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement over 11-days [-5, 5] surrounding the day 
of activist engagement announcement, computed using market model.  
Volatility  Idiosyncratic volatility of targets of both hedge fund activists who use derivatives and who do 
not use derivatives before and after the activist engagement announcement.  
Panel B: Key Explanatory Variable 
Derivative Dummy variable equals one for targets of hedge fund activists who employ derivatives 
Acquired Dummy variable equals one for targets of hedge fund activists, who employ derivatives, that get 
acquired  
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
MV Market value of the firm 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) 
Ln(MV) Natural logarithm of MV. 
M/B 
 
Market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided 
by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ) 
Leverage Total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item 
(DLTT+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)) 
CF/E 
 
Cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) 
divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item 
PRC×SHROUT) 
Cash Cash of the target firms (Compustat Item CH) 
Cash/Assets Cash of the target firms (Compustat Item CH) divided by total assets (Compustat item AT) 
P/E Stock Price (CRSP Item PRC) divided by earnings per share (Compustat Item NI/Compustat 
Item CSHO) 
 
 
 
